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PROBLEMS WITH AWARD-FEE CONTRACTS IN THE 




Award-fee arrangements are a valuable contractual approach for the Department of 
Defense (DoD) when used properly. Award-fee contracts provide incentives to motivate 
contractor performance in areas critical to program success that are susceptible to 
judgmental and qualitative measurement and evaluation. The award-fee process allows 
the DoD to evaluate a contractor’s performance, appropriately recognize 
accomplishments, and provide a reward. The DoD has the flexibility to develop criteria to 
evaluate both the performance levels and the conditions under which these levels were 
achieved during the evaluation period. An award-fee arrangement rewards satisfactory or 
better performance, provides incentives for the contractor to improve performance, and 
records the assessment of the contractor’s performance. While it is DoD policy to use 
objective criteria whenever possible to measure performance, there are times when only 
an incentives based on subjective criteria will achieve the desired objectives. However, 
subjective evaluations may raise concerns that some award fees are paid but not earned. 
Lack of DoD acquisition workforce training and experience in utilizing award fee type 
contracts, coupled with subjective evaluations, may contribute toward award fees being 
paid even when the contractor does not achieve the desired objectives for which 
incentives were offered.  
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A. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
Award-fee contracts are used by the Department of Defense (DoD) to achieve 
specific acquisition objectives by incorporating a financial reward, or incentive, for a 
contractor to accomplish those objectives. Award-fee contracts are one of the two types 
of incentive contracting prescribed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 16.4, 
Defense FAR Supplement (DFARS) 216.4, and relevant material issued in its 
companion resource, Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) 216.4, which 
includes Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) procurement-related 
guidelines (“Incentive Contracting,” n.d.).  
Incentives are designed to motivate or drive the contractor performance in order 
to meet specific objectives during the period of performance (POP) of the contract. This 
is accomplished by establishing reasonable and attainable targets that are clearly 
communicated to the contractor; designing incentives to motivate contractor efforts that 
might not otherwise be emphasized and devising arrangements that discourage 
contractor inefficiency and waste. By design, incentives are tightly integrated into 
overall acquisition strategies for very specific purposes in DoD contracts. By 
developing incentives, the risk level may be reduced, uncertainty may be reduced, and 
favorable behavior may be increased throughout a program’s life cycle (Tremaine, 
2008). 
In accordance with FAR 16.401(a), incentive contracts are described as 
“appropriate when a firm-fixed-price contract is not appropriate and the required 
supplies or services can be acquired at lower costs and, in certain instances, with 
improved delivery or technical performance, by relating the amount of profit or fee 
payable under the contract to the contractor’s performance” (FAR Subpart 16.4—
Incentive Contracts). 
There are four (4) factors that can alter the success rate and risk level of fully 
executing an incentive-type contract in the DoD: (1) funding instability, (2) technology 
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barriers, (3) leadership changes, and (4) cultural barriers. Individually, each factor can 
greatly alter the final desired outcome when using incentive-based contracting, and 
often more than one factor or all of these factors are present (Tremaine, 2008). 
According to FAR 16.401(e)(1) Application, an award-fee contract is suitable 
for use when 
1. The work to be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective 
to devise predetermined objective incentive targets applicable to cost, 
schedule, and technical performance; 
2. The likelihood of meeting acquisition objectives will be enhanced by 
using a contract that effectively motivates the contractor toward 
exceptional performance and provides the Government with the 
flexibility to evaluate both actual performance and  
3. Any additional administrative effort and cost required to monitor and 
evaluate performance are justified by the expected benefits as 
documented by a risk and cost benefit analysis to be includes in the 
Determination and Findings references in 16.401(e)(5)(iii). 
 
FAR 16.401(e)(5) Limitations states, “No award-fee contract shall be awarded 
unless 
• All of the limitations in 16.301.3, that are applicable to cost-
reimbursement contracts only, are complied with; 
• An award-fee plan is completed in accordance with the requirements in 
16.401(e)(3); and 
•  A determination and finding is completed in accordance with 16.401(d) 
addressing all of the suitability items in 16.401(e)(1). 
 
According to the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (OUSD) 
memorandum, “Proper Use of Award Fee Contracts and Award Fee Provisions,” April 
24, 2007, the use of award-fee contracting increased in previous years, particularly 
cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) contracts. This memorandum states DoD policy for proper 
use of award fee contracts and provisions, and refers to FAR 16.104 Factors in 
selecting contract types, which requires assessment of a number of factors to select 
proper contract type, including “price competition, price analysis, cost analysis, type 
and complexity of requirement, urgency of requirement, period of performance or 
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length of production run, the contractor’s technical capability and financial 
responsibility, the adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system, concurrent 
contracts, and the extent and nature of proposed subcontracting and acquisition 
history.” This memorandum further references the suitability of using this type of 
contract as stated above. (OUSD Memorandum April 24, 2007) (FAR 16.405-2(b))1)(i) 
in this memorandum, revised to FAR 16.401(e)(1)(i).  
The objective of this research project is to evaluate the utilization, execution, 
and development of award-fee contracts within the Department of Defense (DoD). Is 
DoD utilizing award-fee contracts as prescribed in FAR Subpart 16.4? This research 
will be an examination on how effectively and efficiently DoD is applying award-fee 
contracts, including Fixed-Price and Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contracts. The research will 
evaluate DoD training, Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, and the 
overall application of award-fee contracting. The overall goal is to develop 
recommendations and alternatives to award-fee contracting based on the research 
findings.  
B. ABOUT THE STUDY 
The object of this research project is to focus on how award-fee contracting can 
actually perform the intended—lower the cost for the Government. How can the 
contracting field develop or re-develop award-fee contracts to become more effective 
and more beneficial to the Government? 
Below is a list of questions that will be answered and used either to develop 
alternative methods to apply award-fee contracts, or to identify “best practices” in 
which the current applications of award-fee contracting have been effective:  
1. How can contracting personnel better manage award-fee contracts? 
2. Are award-fee contracts really cost-effective for the Government? 
3. How can the Government better measure, objectively and quantitatively, 
the overall performance of the contract? 
4. Who is actually benefiting from award-fee contracting – the Government 
or the Contractor? 
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C.  METHODOLOGY 
One method to be used during this project is a literature review on DoD 
documents pertaining to award-fee contracts. With this information, we will evaluate: 
• How well the overall contract was managed: 
• Were there any outstanding issues? 
• How the contractor was evaluated? 
• Were objectives clearly defined? 
• Are there any trends?  
We will review federal regulations and DoD policies and initiatives pertaining 
to award-fee contracts. This method will give us a standard that contracting personnel 
should follow. We want to know whether or not these regulations are understood, 
utilized, and implemented accurately.  
With these methods, we hope to fully understand award-fee contracts and 
decide whether or not this type of contract is actually beneficial to the Government. 
Also, it may be determined that this type of contract should be limited to a certain type 
of requirement or discontinued altogether. We hope to understand the practice of using 
award fees in order to determine the best method of contracting and to better serve the 
Government.  
D. ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumption for this research is that the Department of Defense (DoD) has 
problems in using and administering award-fee contracts to motivate excellent 
contractor performance and to achieve desired acquisition outcomes. 
E. ORGANIZATION OF RESEARCH 
Chapter I is an introduction and a brief discussion of award-fee contracting in 
the federal government focused on Department of Defense (DoD) contracting methods. 
Chapter I identifies the research focus and strategy plan by listing the research 
objectives and questions, describing the methodology used during this research project, 
and defining key terms. 
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Chapter II introduces the reader to the history of incentive contracting and the 
development of award-fee contracting. It defines award-fee contracting and the purpose 
and goals of this type of contract. Federal acquisition regulations and DoD policies and 
directives that guide government contracting personnel in appropriate use of this 
method of contracting will be reviewed.  
Chapter III will be a discussion of current-day incentive contracting practices 
and government policy changes. This chapter will be an overall review of the 
progression of award-fee contracting—ongoing issues, trends, and overall impact. Also 
included in this chapter will be reviews of Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
reports and their findings and recommendations, a literature review of scholarly 
journals, review of Executive and Congressional actions, and DoD planning and 
initiatives in award-fee contracting.  
Chapter IV will be a compilation of the results and findings gathered throughout 
the research process. All the research questions listed in Chapter I will be recognized 
and answered in this section. Also, Chapter IV will serve as the conclusion of this 
research report, which will provide a general overview of the findings and 
recommendations for when it is beneficial to the federal government to use award-fee 
contracting. 
 6 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION TO AWARD-FEE CONTRACTING 
1. Incentive Contracts 
FAR Subpart 16.401 provides the following guidance for incentive fee 
contracts: 
Incentive contracts as described in this Subpart are appropriate when a 
firm-fixed-price contract is not appropriate and the required supplies or 
services can be acquired at lower costs and, in certain instances, with 
improved delivery or technical performance, by relating the amount of 
profit or fee payable under the contract to the contractor’s performance. 
Incentive contracts are designed to obtain specific acquisition objectives 
by 
1. Establishing reasonable and attainable targets that are clearly 
communicated to the contractor; and 
2. Including appropriate incentive arrangements designed to 
(i) motivate contractor efforts that might not otherwise be emphasized; 
and 
(ii) discourage contractor inefficiency and waste. 
Incentive contracts are used when the pricing risk is not sufficiently large 
enough to justify the use of a cost-plus-fee contract, but is too great to support the use 
of a firm-fixed price contract (Cibinic, Nash, & Yukins, 2011). Incentive contracts are 
considered to be a “middle ground” type of contract. They are to be used when there is 
little pricing risk to consider, and when pricing for the requirement is too complex or 
too complicated to determine a fixed price. Incentive contracts hold the contractor 
responsible for some risks without having all of the responsibility for pricing risks. 
Both parties to the incentive contract share the risk by basing the contractor’s profits on 
cost or quality of the contractor’s performance (Manuel, 2010). 
Incentive contracts contain two distinctions: objective and subjective incentives. 
Objective incentives use a formula that is included in the contract to determine the 
profit earned by the contractor based on the actual performance results achieved (i.e, 
Cost-Plus-Award-Fee). For subjective incentives, the Government determines the profit 
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earned on the contract based on the evaluation of the contractor’s performance (i.e., 
Fixed-Price with Award-fee) (Cibinic, Nash, & Yukins, 2011). 
There are several types of incentive contracts, but only the following will be 
discussed for this report: (1) Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee, (2) Fixed-Price Incentive, (3) 
Fixed-Price with Award-fee, and (4) Cost-Plus-Award-Fee contracts. Each type of 
incentive contract will be discussed briefly. 
FAR Subpart 16.405-1(a) describes cost-plus-incentive-fee awards as a “cost-
reimbursement contract that provides for the initially negotiated fee to be adjusted later 
by a formula based on the relationship of total allowable costs to total target costs. This 
contract type specifies a target cost, a target fee, minimum and maximum fees, and a 
fee adjustment formula. After contract performance, the fee payable to the contractor is 
determined in accordance with the formula. The formula is determined by the target 
cost, and the fee payable increases or decreases depending on whether or not the 
contractor meets or exceeds the target costs.” 
Cost-plus-incentive-fee (CPIF) contracts are designed to encourage the 
contractor to manage the contract effectively. FAR Subpart 16.301-2 Application states 
that appropriate applications for CPIF contracts are for services or for development and 
test programs “only when uncertainties involved in contract performance do not permit 
costs to be estimated with sufficient accuracy to use any type of fixed-price contract” 
(FAR Subpart 16.301-2). All parties must understand fully the requirement and work to 
be performed for CPIF contracts to determine reasonable, real-time target costs, and to 
achieve the results desired from this form of incentive contract. 
Fixed-Price Incentive (FPI) contracts are very similar to CPIF contracts. The 
most significant difference is that FPI contracts include a ceiling price in lieu of the 
minimum and maximum fees. FAR Subpart 16.403(a) states that a FPI contract 
“provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by application of 
a formula based on the relationship of total final negotiated cost to total target cost. The 
final price is subject to a price ceiling, negotiated at the outset of the contract” (FAR 
16.403(a)).  
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FPI contracts have two variations: firm target and successive target. A FPI firm 
target contract is appropriate when the parties can negotiate at the outset a firm target 
cost, target profit, and profit adjustment formula. This formula will provide a fair and 
reasonable incentive and a ceiling (firm target) that provides for the contractor to 
assume an appropriate share of the risk. When the contractor assumes a considerable or 
major share of the cost responsibility under the adjustment formula, the target profit 
should reflect this responsibility (FAR 16.403-1).  
A FPI successive targets contract “is appropriate when: 
1. Available cost or pricing information is not sufficient to permit the 
negotiation of a realistic firm target cost and profit before award; 
2. Sufficient information is available to permit negotiation of initial targets; 
and 
3. There is reasonable assurance that additional reliable information will be 
available at an early point in the contract performance so as to permit 
negotiation of either (i) a firm fixed price or (ii) firm targets and a 
formula for establishing final profit and price that will provide a fair and 
reasonable incentive. This additional information is not limited to 
experience under the contract, itself, but may be drawn from other 
contracts for the same or similar items (FAR 16.403-2(b)). 
2. The Purpose and Goals of Award Fee Contracting 
The purpose and goals of award fee contracting are to evaluate a contractor’s 
performance and appropriately recognize certain accomplishments, resulting in a 
reward for exceptional performance. DoD contracting personnel have the flexibility to 
develop criteria to evaluate both the performance levels and the conditions under which 
these levels were achieved during the evaluation period. 
The memorandum “Appropriate Use of Incentive Contracts” from the Executive 
Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, to Chief Acquisition 
Officers and Senior Procurement Executives, states “Incentive contracts are used 
throughout the Federal Government to encourage contractors to perform efficiently and 
effectively. Using incentives appropriately and applying strong project and acquisition 
management practices are vital to accomplishing mission needs, minimizing waste, and 
maximizing value.” 
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3. Policies  
The DoD issues ongoing directives, instructions, and memoranda in order to 
provide comprehensive contracting policies and improve performance of the defense 
acquisition system. These policies are formulated and revised for a wide variety of 
reasons, and are often made in response to or in compliance with Presidential or 
Congressional acts, regulatory additions and changes, Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) reports, and Office of Management and Budget (OMB) guidelines. 
DoD acquisition policies provide information to guide its workforce, including 
the military services, program offices, and contracting personnel, and to inform its 
contractors and industrial partners. As stated previously in this chapter, FAR Subpart 
16.4 Incentive Contracts instructs contracting officers and personnel when it is 
appropriate to use award fee contracts and when to apply it. DFARS Subpart 216.4 
Incentive Contracts, along with PGI Subpart 216.4 Incentive Contracts, add further 
information and guidance to the FAR. Each of these regulatory documents references 
and complements the others. 
As mentioned above, the OMB Office of Federal Procurement and Policy 
(OFPP) issued “Appropriate Use of Incentive Contracts” in its 2007 memorandum, 
preceded by “A Guide to Best Practices for Performance-Based Service Contracting” 
dated October 1998. According to the foreword by Administrator Deidre A. Lee, 
Performance-Based Service Contracting (PBSC) was “pioneered within the Department 
of Defense with a great deal of success.” These OMB documents emphasize “objective, 
measurable performance requirements and quality standards in developing statements 
of work, selecting contractors, determining contract type and incentives, and 
performing contract administration.” Along with the FAR, DFARS, PGI, and DoD 
regulations and directions, they can provide acquisition personnel “help to correct 
problems commonly associated with services contracts and identified in numerous 
audits, including cost overruns, schedule delays, failure to achieve specified results, and 
other performance problems.” 
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In addition to the above regulations and guidance, the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD), the Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 
(USD [AT&L]), the Under Secretary of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy 
(USD [DPAP]), and leaders of the military services issue directives, instructions, and 
memoranda covering policies and procedures focused on compliance with regulations, 
attention to recommendations, assessments of problems, and strategies for 
improvements. 
In a memorandum issued April 24, 2007 by the Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense, the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy discussed the 
proper use of award fee contracts and award fee provisions. In this memorandum, 
Director Shay D. Assad reminded everyone of the criteria and objectives that need to be 
met before establishing a CPAF contract by restating FAR 16.104 and FAR 16.405-2 
(b)(1)(i). Director Assad emphasized that it is DoD policy to utilize objective criteria 
whenever possible to measure contract performance. When it is determined that 
objective criteria for cost, technical performance, or schedule do not exist, then it is 
suitable to use a CPAF contract. In this memorandum, the Head of the Contracting 
Activity (HCA) is directed to sign a determination and finding (D&F) that “the work to 
be performed is such that it is neither feasible nor effective to devise predetermined 
objective incentive targets applicable to cost, technical performance or schedule.” Also, 
the directive allows the HCA to delegate approval authority one level below them in the 
contracting organization (Assad, 2007). 
DoD Instruction 5000.02 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System” (to 
implement DoD Directive 5000.1) was issued by the USD (AT&L) to the OSD, 
Military Departments, and all organizational entities within the DoD (December 8, 
2008). This Instruction includes very specific responsibilities for defense acquisition 
executives and program managers to be accountable for cost, schedule, and 
performance reporting. It includes specific information regarding the structure of 
acquisitions and states, “Contractors are entitled to earn reasonable rewards on DoD 
contracts, including competitively awarded contracts.” 
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Also included in DoD Instruction 5000.2 is a chart for Earned Value 
Management (EVM) for all contract types, and reference to the DoD Earned Value 
Management Implementation Guide (EVMIG) Section 2.5.3 Award Fee Contracts. This 
Guide reiterates the general concept of award fee contracting and says, “Award fee 
criteria should be carefully selected to properly motivate the contractor’s management 
and performance during the award fee period. Qualitative criteria are generally 
recommended, but clear distinctions should be established between the performance 
levels to guide the Program Management Office (PMO) when evaluating performance.” 
Also, the Guide states, “If such qualitative criteria are difficult to support during the 
evaluation process, the PMO should consider using subjective criteria for EVM 
performance results” (“Earned value management implementation guide,” October 
2006). 
Along with all of the regulations and resources included above, comprehensive 
information about DoD acquisition policies is readily available on the Department of 
Defense OSD, AT&L, DPAP, and OMB websites, including guidelines for selecting 
contract types including award fee, writing a statement of work (SOW) and 
performance work statement (PWS), job analysis, quality assurance (QA) plan and 
surveillance, contract administration, and conflict resolution. 
As stated previously in this chapter, FAR Subpart 16.4 Incentive Contracts 
instructs Contracting Officers and personnel when it is appropriate to use award-fee 
contracts and when to apply it. Procedures, Guidance, and Information (PGI) 216.401 
Incentives Contracts, and Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DFARS) Subpart 216.4 Incentives Contracts, add DoD incentive contracting 
regulations to the FAR. Each regulatory document both references the other and 
complements the established regulations.  
4. Award-fee Pool and Award-fee Plan 
The DFARS 216.4 and PGI 216.4 elaborate on the established objectives and 
criteria for award-fee contracts listed in the FAR. Both the DFARS and PGI list in more 
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detail the requirements for an award-fee plan, award-fee pool, and award-fee evaluation 
and payments. DFARS 216.405-2, Cost-plus-award-fee contracts, states: 
1. Award-fee pool. The award-fee pool is the total available award-fee for 
each evaluation period for the life of the contract. The contracting 
officer shall perform an analysis of appropriate fee distribution to ensure 
at least 40 per cent of the award fee is available for the final evaluation 
so that the award fee is appropriately distributed over all evaluation 
periods to incentivize the contractor throughout performance of the 
contract. The percentage of award fee available for the final evaluation 
may be set below 40 per cent if the contracting officer determines that a 
lower percentage is appropriate, and this determination is approved by 
the head of the contracting activity (HCA). The HCA may not delegate 
this approval authority. 
2. Award-fee evaluation and payments. Award-fee payments other than 
payments resulting from the evaluation at the end of an award-fee period 
are prohibited. (This prohibition does not apply to base-fee payments.) 
The fee-determining official’s rating for award-fee evaluations will be 
provided to the contractor within 45 calendar days of the end of the 
period being evaluated. The final award-fee payment will be consistent 
with the fee-determining official’s final evaluation of the contractor’s 
overall performance against the cost, schedule, and performance 
outcomes specified in the award-fee plan. 
PGI 216.405-2 guidance states when it is appropriate to utilize cost-plus-award-
fee contracts: 
4. The cost-plus-award-fee contract is also suitable for level of effort 
contracts where mission feasibility is established but measurement of 
achievement must be by subjective evaluation rather than objective 
measurement.  
Also, PGI 216.405-2 gives the contracting activity some guidance on 
establishing a board to determine the award-fee amount: 
5.  The contracting activity may 
 (i) Establish a board to 
(A) evaluate the contractor's performance; and 
(B) determine the amount of the award or recommend an amount to 
the contracting officer; and 
 
(ii) Afford the contractor an opportunity to present information on its 
own behalf. 
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PGI 216.4 also provides an example of performance evaluation criteria and the 
contractor’s evaluation report. Both of these forms will be discussed further in the 
following section of this chapter. 
Currently, the usage of cost reimbursement contracts has been in the public eye 
since the Bush administration. In the present Obama administration, firm-fixed price 
contracts are preferred, and cost reimbursement contracts are to be considered as a last 
resort. The current standings of award-fee contracting will be discussed in more detail 
in Chapter III. 
Under FAR 16.401(e)(2), the award-fee amount shall be allocated with these 
factors: (1) the contractor’s overall cost; (2) schedule; and (3) technical performance 
measured against the contract requirements criteria stated in the award-fee plan. The 
methodology for determining the award fee shall be at the discretion of the 
Government. The contractor cannot be awarded the award fee if the three factors (listed 






Available To Be 
Earned Description 
Excellent 91%-100% Contractor has exceeded almost all of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall 
cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and 
measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period. 
Very Good 76%-90% Contractor has exceeded many of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, 
schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and measured 
against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period. 
Good 51%-75% Contractor has exceeded some of the significant award-fee criteria and has met overall cost, 
schedule, and technical performance requirements of the contract as defined and measured 
against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee evaluation period. 
Satisfactory No Greater Than 
50% 
Contractor has met overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of the 
contract as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee 
evaluation period. 
Unsatisfactory 0% Contractor has failed to meet overall cost, schedule, and technical performance requirements of 
the contract as defined and measured against the criteria in the award-fee plan for the award-fee 
evaluation period. 
Table 1.   FAR Subpart 16.4—Incentive Contracts 
An award-fee pool is the total award-fee amount available throughout the entire 
contract period (base plus options) for each evaluation period. With each evaluation 
period, the contractor has not earned any percentage of the award fee, but starts with 
0% and works toward 100%. 
There is no FAR requirement published about how to establish the amount to be 
held in the award-fee pool. In the acquisition process, parties involved in the 
procurement must analyze the complexity of the requirement and develop an award-fee 
amount logically. 
As stated previously in this chapter, FAR Subpart 16.4 Incentive Contracts 
instructs Contracting Officers and personnel when it is appropriate to use award-fee 
contracts and when to apply it. The Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS), and its companion resource Procedures, Guidance, and 
Information (PGI) 216.401 Incentives Contracts, add DoD incentive contracting 
regulations to the FAR. Each regulatory document both references the other and 
complements the established regulations.  
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5. Advantages and Disadvantages 
The advantages of award-fee contracting are that they are designed to encourage 
the contractor efforts toward exceptional performance in areas critical to program 
success, and are utilized to discourage waste and inefficiencies. They also afford 
acquisition personnel to have the flexibility to develop criteria to evaluate both the 
performance levels and the conditions under which these levels were achieved during 
the evaluation period. 
The disadvantages of award-fee contracts arise from the necessity of having 
experience and knowledge to apply incentives appropriately, and the subjective nature 
of evaluating performance accurately. Subjective evaluations may result in payment of 
award fees when they were not earned, because they have not achieved the desired 
objectives for which they were offered. 
As reviewed in the OUSD Memorandum, “Proper Use of Award Fee Contracts 
and Award Fee Provisions,” there are many factors that must be considered in selecting 
the proper contract type, including: price competition; price and cost analysis; 
requirement type; complexity and urgency; period of performance; the contractor’s 
technical capability, financial responsibility, and accounting system; concurrent 
contracts; extent and nature of proposed subcontracting; and acquisition history. 
Evaluating all of these factors is a considerable task, and is based on subjective 
judgments that may be influenced or biased. 
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III. CURRENT STATUS AND INITIATIVES 
A. OVERALL REVIEW OF THE PROGRESSION OF AWARD-FEE 
CONTRACTING 
1. Ongoing Problems and Trends 
Award-fee contracting has not driven performance outcomes in federal 
government contracting as expected, particularly in the past decade. Ongoing problems 
received a great deal of attention due to the failure to achieve desired outcomes, and 
reached a high point in DoD contracting for Iraq and Afghanistan. The resultant GAO 
and Inspector General reports, along with research conducted by public and private 
organizations and individuals, received considerable attention and contained many 
proposals and recommendations for change. 
Ongoing problems and issues that are challenges to using this type of contract 
are included in a Summary of Consensus Views from a research effort requested by the 
USD (AT&L) in response to GAO-06-66, “DoD Has Paid Billions in Award and 
Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes.” The goal of this research was “to 
investigate where the acquisition community implemented award and incentive fee 
practices that had a favorable impact on performance outcomes and could be adopted as 
best practices throughout the acquisition community.” The summary highlighted these 
problems and issues: 
1. Government construction of the award fee plan (including metrics, 
incentives, etc.) may not link with the offeror’s proposed solution or 
motivations. 
2. Industry welcomes the use of base fee to better delineate the difference 
between “best efforts” (e.g. base fee) and “excellence” (award fee). 
3. In some cases, the government does not follow its own policies on award 
fee. 
4. On occasion, award fee evaluation criteria are poorly explained or 
justified and communication of award fee goals and criteria are not 
clearly explained. 
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5. It is difficult to establish the relationship between awards for month-to-
month activities to the goals of a multiple-year program. The linkage is 
not always apparent. 
6. Administration of award fee criteria can change in post award and create 
problems during contract execution. 
7. Government personnel are not always adequately trained in managing 
award fee contracts. 
8. Post-award administration of award fee contracts is time and resource 
intensive. 
9. Desired outcomes are not always driven by the award fee because of 
insufficient funds available and subjectivity of the final evaluation. 
10. There are sometimes inconsistencies in the timing of the award fee in 
line with the evaluation criteria. 
11. Government and contractors sometimes have different perceptions of the 
purpose of award fees. 
12. In some cases, there is government failure to understand the economics 
of defense contracting and its impact on government contractors 
13. From time to time, there is inappropriate use of award fee contracts. 
14. Requirements are sometimes too subjective and do not measure 
outcomes that are sought by the DoD. (Gilbreth & Hubbard, July 2008) 
Administration and oversight of award-fee contracts are complex processes that 
require large amounts of time and attention, and can easily become a source of 
problems. The most challenging problems for DoD personnel are time, training, and 
experience, particularly in today’s government climate of sequestration, furloughs, and 
budget cuts. The laws, regulations, guidance, instructions, and directives to be followed 
in any acquisition are almost infinite. Along with applying this information, contracting 
personnel must understand requirements, conduct market research, prepare proposals, 
solicit bids, and fulfill their administrative responsibilities. Because award-fee contracts 
require significant time and effort to administer, all of these factors must be considered 
prior to making a decision to use this type of contract. Consideration of the resources 
necessary must include not only the experience, workload, and availability of 
contracting personnel, but also the contracting officer, monitors, program managers, 
award-fee evaluation board members, and award-fee determination official.  
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GAO reports on award-fee contracts generally have the same conclusions about 
problems in award-fee contracts: award-fee plans not properly developed, award-fee 
plans not properly followed, award fees not properly documented, award-fee 
information missing from contract files, and “lessons learned” not shared among 
agencies and military services. GAO reports recommend following FAR and DFARS 
guidance, along with utilizing OMB guidance and requests for more comprehensive 
guidance from DoD leaders, rather than specifically recommending training for 
acquisition personnel. 
The deficiency in training with regard to award-fee contracts does not end with 
acquisition personnel because personnel involved with award-fee board also should be 
trained. When the award-fee board meets to evaluate and discuss the award-fee for the 
period they need to understand what they are actually required to perform. All too often 
the award-fee board will receive presentations from the contractor, reporting their self-
evaluation, from government quality assurance personnel reporting their findings on 
what they have observed during the evaluation period, and from others relevant to 
contractor performance during the period, not fully knowing exactly how they are to 
use the information that is presented. Should they put much stock in the contractor’s 
self evaluation? Should they blindly follow the quality inspector’s reports, or can they 
use only this information? Experience tells that the contractor will always accentuate 
positive aspects of their performance while marginalizing negative aspects, but it’s not 
uncommon for positive aspects of contractors’ performance to be marginalized by 
quality assurance/evaluation personnel. Although some items are addressed in the 
Award-fee Plan, board members need to receive training so they know exactly what 
information they are supposed to use and how to use the information. On the surface 
observations and inspections from assurance personnel would seem to be all the 
information that would be required, but many evaluation factors are concerned with 
operating activities other than performance, reporting, cost/price, and others. GAO 
reported that between 2004 and 2008 approximately $9 billion in award-fees were paid 
to contractors, some of which was paid to contractors that received unsatisfactory 
ratings.  
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Many acquisition personnel don’t get the opportunity to work with award-fee 
contracts often, if at all, making experience with award-fee contracts somewhat difficult 
to obtain. Some contracting offices are staffed with very experienced personnel that 
have worked with award-fee contracts, but some are staffed with relatively new 
acquisition personnel that have not had the opportunity to experience planning, 
developing and/or administering award-fee requirements. Lack of experienced 
personnel accompanied by a general shortage of manpower across the workforce lends 
to situations in which it is not uncommon for inexperienced personnel to be given a 
contract and be expected to hit the ground running. This poses a particular problem 
with award-fee contracts, due to the amount of oversight required and a nature that can 
be fairly complex, it is not always easy to readily identify exactly what should be done 
without at least some experience with the subject. The only solution to this situation is 
to provide developmental training.  
Some award-fee contracts within DoD have been awarded using evaluation 
factors as illogical as development of contractor personnel rosters being used as an 
evaluation factor. Meaning the contractor simply keeping the government supplied with 
an updated personnel roster was an evaluation factor for the award-fee. Given the 
evaluation factor in question was for a contract for facilities support services, not in a 
combat operations area, it is easy to determine that the personnel roster, although it may 
be required, is not important to successful contract performance, nor does it add any 
measurable value to the government. Items such as personnel rosters and similar 
documents may be required by the contract but are not factors that affect contract 
performance; hence they should not be considered for use as evaluation factors of 
award-fees. This particular evaluation factor presents multiple problems. Beyond the 
fact that this evaluation factor does not have the ability to encourage or inspire the 
contractor to perform in an exceptional manner, it is not measurable in any meaningful 
manner, which is a primary concern when developing evaluation factors. Items such as 
personnel rosters are simply done or not done, pass or fail. Although the argument 
could possibly be made that the rosters where delivered to the government earlier than 
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required or more often than required to demonstrate the contractor performing at a 
higher level, the argument is weak at best, and is a clear example of actions to avoid. 
2. Unpredicted/Unidentified Effects of Award-fee Contracts 
Award-fee contracts allow for a high level of communication to occur between 
the contractor and the government. Award-fee contracts involve the government giving 
contractors’ detailed evaluations of their performance, identifying issues as they arise, 
as a result the contractor should be able to improve performance on a constant basis for 
the life of the contract. Unless the contractor feels the government analysis is wrong, in 
which case communication can determine if the government is wrong and why. In 
either case the contracting parties are forced to analyze performance on a regular basis 
and communicate with each other regarding any problems. This communication should 
provide for the best possible performance, yet this process can breakdown do to 
complacency and inattention to desired outcomes  
Evaluators are usually government personnel working closely with the 
contractor monitoring the contractor’s performance. This can lead to a situation in 
which the contractor follows an evaluator’s direction in order to earn higher award-fees, 
even though the evaluator is not authorized to obligate the government and the 
contractor knows this fact. This type of action typically increases contract cost and can 
lead to Anti-Deficiency Act violations. When this occurs the contractor feels that they 
are providing excellent service to the government, going above and beyond the terms of 
the contract; however, this is an example of actions that are just the opposite of 
excellent performance, because it undermines cost efficiency and violates contract 
terms and condition, federal regulations and statutes.  
Some issues have been identified when government evaluators give high ratings 
to contractors due to personal relationships. Government personnel overseeing 
contracts work closely alongside contractor personnel working on contracts. It is human 
nature for people working close together to form relationships and even friendships. 
This in itself is not a problem. The problem arises when the personal relationship 
affects the professional relationship. It can be difficult for some evaluation personnel to 
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give a low award-fee rating due to the perception that a low rating will negatively affect 
the relationship with a friend that works for the contractor being rated. This represents a 
clear conflict of interest that must be addressed. 
B. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE REPORTS 
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) conducts financial audits and 
provides investigative reports to help analyze federal expenditures of taxpayer dollars. 
According to its current mission statement, the agency exists to support Congress in 
meeting its constitutional responsibilities, and to help improve performance and 
accountability of the federal government for the benefit of the American people. 
GAO investigations of the Department of Defense report problems about 
spending and provide audits, and may be influenced by requests from members of 
Congress. The reports contain recommendations regarding DoD contracting practices, 
and often result in DoD leaders reiterating policies, or in formulating new or increased 
guidance to its workforce. 
Several GAO reports in the past decade have had substantial impact on the 
criticism of DoD expenditures, resulting in increased public and legislative scrutiny. It 
is evident from the resultant DoD actions to provide more comprehensive guidance, 
along with an increase in its requirements for hiring and training acquisition personnel, 
that these reports have had a positive affect in addressing problems in contracting. The 
most influential GAO reports regarding problems with DoD award-fee contracts 
include: 
GAO-09-839T, “FEDERAL CONTRACTING Application of OMB Guidance 
Can Improve Use of Award-fee Contracts” dated August 2009, was testimony to 
several Congressional committees. This report discusses problems that have been 
identified and makes recommendations to correct improper usage of award-fee 
contracts. Practices that are inconsistent with OMB guidance aimed at improving the 
use of award-fee contracts are identified specifically, including: limiting the use of 
rollover of award fees; linking award fees to performance outcomes; using evaluation 
factors to motivate performance; and eliminating award fee payments for unsatisfactory 
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performance. Although this report covered five separate government agencies, only 
discussions of DOD are relevant to this project. Accordingly, it was the primary 
recommendation in GAO-009-839T to follow existing OMB guidance and policy for 
award fees. 
This report was preceded by GAO-09-630, “FEDERAL CONTRACTING 
Guidance on Award Fees Has Led to Better Practices but Is Not Consistently Applied” 
dated May 2009, which was requested by members of Congress. This request asked 
GAO to “identify agencies’ actions to revise or develop award-fee policies and 
guidance to reflect OMB guidance, assess the consistency of current practices with the 
new guidance, and determine the extent agencies are collecting, analyzing, and sharing 
information on award fees.” The report resulted in a recommendation for the DoD to 
promote application of its current guidance, and for all agencies in the report to work 
together to develop methods to evaluate the effectiveness of award fees and share 
successful strategies. 
GAO-06-66, “DEFENSE ACQUISITIONS DOD Has Paid Billions in Award 
and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes” dated December 2005, was a 
report to the Congressional Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support, 
Committee on Armed Services. It discussed the DoD’s misuse of award-fee contracts, 
and reported that award fees were paid for unsatisfactory evaluations and were “rolled 
over” to give contractors multiple attempts to receive unpaid award fees. The GAO 
recommended in this report that the DoD improve use of award fees by tying them to 
specific outcomes for all incentive contracts. Further recommendations were for the 
DoD to collect and share data to support the effectiveness of award fees. ` 
C. CONGRESSIONAL LEGISLATION 
Congress enacts legislation for DoD budgeting, contracting, and force structure. 
There is Congressional legislation throughout history that addresses acquisition policy 
and management, and establishes requirements for DoD acquisition workforce training, 
including legislation for the management and oversight of contractors. Contractors 
often account for 50% or more of total personnel in military operations, and are used to 
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provide services such as construction, base support, specialized expertise, and private 
security. One of the most beneficial aspects of contracting for support of the DoD is 
prompt response to emerging needs or contingencies, and cost savings from hiring 
contractor personnel only when their services are required. 
The Congressional Research Service prepares reports regarding problems in 
DoD contracting, and raises potential questions to be considered by legislators. 
Effective use and management of contractors undergoes scrutiny by many members of 
Congress, and often results in inquiries and hearings. The National Defense 
Authorization Acts for FY2007-FY2013 contain some of the most comprehensive 
legislation covering DoD budgeting, contracting, force structure, acquisition policy, and 
workforce training, as follows (by year of enactment): 
2006 
• Directed DoD to develop joint policies for requirements definition, 
contingency program management, and contingency contracting. 
 
2008 
• Required contingency contracting training for noon-acquisition 
personnel within DoD. 
• Established the Defense Acquisition Workforce Development Fund. 
• Required DoD, Department of State (DOS), and the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) to agree upon a central database for 
contract information 
• Directed DoD to develop regulations on the selection, training, 
equipping, and conduct of private security contractors. 
 
• Authorized five Joint billets for General/Flag Officer to serve in 
acquisition positions. 
• Required DoD to establish policy to ensure proper development, 
assignment, and employment of military acquisition personnel. 
 
2011 
• Established a Government-wide contingency contracting corps to 
support domestic and overseas operations. 
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• Established oversight and accountability mechanisms for private security 
contractors in significant areas of military operations. 
• Required DoD to review standards and certification of private security 
personnel. 
• Required DoD to establish policy to ensure proper development, 
assignment, and employment of civilian acquisition personnel. 
 
2012 
• Amended the definition of a contingency operation. 
• Required DoD to address contractor support in the Quadrennial Defense 
Review. 
• Required DoD to amend the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) to prohibit contracting with the enemy in the U.S. 
Central Command. 
• Required DoD to amend the DFARS to allow access to the records of 
contractors and subcontractors in U.S. Central Command. 
• Granted authority for DoD to use ‘reachback’ contracting authority to 
support overseas contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
 
2013 
• Extended expedited hiring authority to fill shortages in DoD’s 
acquisition workforce through 2017. 
• Required DoD to issue guidance on responsibility and authority for 
operational contract support policy, planning, and execution. 
• Required DoD, DOS, and USAID to issue guidance regarding data 
collection on contract support for future overseas operations. 
• Mandated the inclusion of operational contract support in certain 
requirements for DoD planning, joint professional military education, 
and management structure. 
• Required Combatant Commanders to develop a contractor reliance risk 
assessment and risk mitigation strategy for operational or contingency 
plans. 
• Described responsibilities of inspectors general during overseas 
contingency operations. 
• Updated the responsibility of senior acquisition personnel within DoD, 
DOS, and USAID for contingency contracting and contract oversight. 
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• Required agencies to establish and maintain a database on price trends of 
items and services under Federal contracts. 
• Required DoD, DOS, and USAID to have independent suspension and 
debarment officials. 
• Stipulated uniform contract writing system requirements. 
• Enhanced the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff regarding the inclusion of operational contract support in National 
Military Strategy. (CRS Analysis of National Defense Authorization 
Acts for FY2007-FY2013) (CRS7-5700, May 2013) 
 
This recent Congressional legislation illustrates the wide-ranging requirements 
and regulations for DoD contracting, and highlights the extensive requirements for 
training of personnel involved in contracting. At the same time, budget cuts for the 
DoD have been mandated as well, creating problems for leaders and managers in 
allocating resources. 
D. GAO ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 
GAO’s first annual report to Congress resulted from a new statutory 
requirement for GAO “to identify federal programs, agencies, offices, and initiatives, 
either within departments of government-wide, which have duplicative goals or 
activities. The report, GAO-11-318SP, “Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication 
in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue” dated March 2011, 
addresses cost-saving or revenue-enhancement opportunities for many government 
agencies and programs, including the DoD. It includes detailed information to address 
problems in “Adherence to New Guidance on Award Fee Contracts Could Improve 
Agencies’ Use of Award Fees and Produce Savings.” 
The report describes “significant disconnects between program results and fees 
paid.” In its research, the GAO found that award-fee guidance was not consistently 
followed, nor were there methods employed for evaluating the effectiveness of award 
fees as tools for improving contractor performance. The recommendations correspond 
with those provided in the August 2009 testimony to Congressional committees, GAO-
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09-839T, “FEDERAL CONTRACTING Application of OMB Guidance Can Improve 
Use of Award-fee Contracts.” 
GAO-11-318SP restates three primary issues that could improve the use of 
award fees and produce savings: (1) award fees are not always linked to outcomes, (2) 
payments are made despite unsatisfactory contractor performance, and (3) award fee 
“rollover” allows contractors to earn previously unearned fees in one evaluation period 
to be rolled over to subsequent periods, allowing additional opportunities. As 
recommended and reported previously in GAO-09-839T, lack of adherence to OMB 
guidance and established policy, along with a change in practices to conform to 
revisions and amendments in the FAR, are identified as causes for problems with 
award-fee contracts in the DoD. 
The report does mention savings that were achieved by the DoD by using 
metrics for software performance, warfighter capability, and cost control that had used 
less defined criteria previously in the Joint Strike Fighter program, resulting in an 
estimated $29 million less in award fees. It also cites instances in which the DoD 
prohibited award fees for unsatisfactory performance in a satellite program for the Air 
Force, resulting in an estimated $10 million saving. 
GAO11-318SP addresses the practice of rollover and advocates limiting its use 
“to exceptional circumstances to avoid compromising the integrity of the award fee 
process.” Also addressed are the amendments to the FAR prohibiting the practices of 
rollover of unearned award fees and awarding fees to contractors that have performed 
unsatisfactorily. It also supports the DoD peer review process for examining contracts 
over a certain dollar threshold for administering award fees. 
E. INVESTIGATION OF WASTE, FRAUD, AND ABUSE 
Many of the most significant problems with award-fee contracts in the DoD 
were reported in audits pursuant to The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2008, Section 842, “Investigation of Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Wartime 
Contracts and Contracting Processes in Iraq and Afghanistan,” January 28, 2008. 
Section 842 requires thorough audits “to identify potential waste, fraud, and abuse in 
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the performance of (1) Department of Defense contracts, subcontracts, and task and 
delivery orders for the logistical support of coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan; 
and (2) Federal agency contracts, subcontracts, and task and delivery orders for the 
performance of security and reconstruction function in Iraq and Afghanistan.”  
An excellent example of these audits was provided by the DoD Assistant 
Inspector General for Acquisition and Contract Management, “U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers’ Use of Award Fees on Contracts in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Report D-2010-
049) issued April 2010. The objective of this report was to evaluate procedures used by 
the U.S. Army Corp of Engineers (USACE) Transatlantic Programs Center (TAC) for 
determining and awarding fees on 15 cost-plus-award-fee (CPAF) task orders worth 
approximately $116.4 million. These task orders were for indefinite delivery, indefinite 
quantity (IDIQ) contracts for construction-related services throughout the U.S. Central 
Command (CENTCOM) in Iraq and Afghanistan. TAC is responsible for providing 
engineering, construction, and contracting services to the CENTCOM. 
The report states that personnel responsible for contracting and award fees did 
not properly manage and oversee the award-fee process. Awards are usually for base 
years and option years. Minimum and maximum quantity limits are specified in the 
basic contracts. In this case, however, “officials did not: 
• develop adequate award-fee plans for incentivizing and evaluating 
contractor performance, 
• adequately conduct oversight and evaluation responsibilities, or 
• adequately document and support award-fee ratings.” 
According to the report, this outcome occurred because “USACE did not have 
policies and procedures for administering award fees consistently and in accordance 
with Federal Acquisition Regulation requirements” and “did not adopt Army best 
practices documented in the Army Contracting Agency (ACA) Award Fee Contracts 
Handbook.” It identifies that TAC did not establish effective procedures for 
administration and oversight of these CPAF task orders. Also, the report reiterates that 
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internal controls were necessary and required under DoD Instruction 5010.40, “Managers’ 
Internal Control (MIC) Program Procedures.” 
The report also acknowledges there were inadequate resources that were not 
consistently available to properly administer these task orders. Subsequently, the Principal 
Assistant Responsible for Contracting-Winchester (PARC-WIN) put a moratorium on the 
use of award-fee contracts, and required Contracting Officers to request approval for their 
use by submitting justification that included cost-benefit analysis. It was noted that, as a 
result, the number of award-fee contracts was substantially reduced. 
Recommendations in the report were for the Director, National Contracting 
Organization, Headquarters, USACE, in coordination with the PARC-WIN, to develop 
standard operating policies and procedures for administering effective award-fee programs. 
These procedures were recommended to provide additional detail to the guidance in the 
FAR, DFARS, Army Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (AFARS), and the Army 
Contracting Agency (ACA) Award-fee Contracts Handbook. It was determined they were 
necessary to establish requirements for cost-benefit analysis and for determining the 
availability and adequacy of resources to correct weaknesses in the administration of 
award-fee contracts at TAC. 
It was recommended that the policies and procedures address, at a minimum: 
• development of (AFPs) adequate for motivating and overseeing 
contractor performance, 
• key award fee functions for properly oversight and evaluation of award-
fee contracts, and 
• the documentation needed to support award-fee ratings. 
F. DOD TRAINING PROGRAMS FOR AWARD-FEE CONTRACTING 
Current training programs for award-fee contracting for DoD acquisition 
personnel depends on several variables. These include availability of time, the type of 
contracting required for a particular agency or military service, understanding the 
agency or service incentive philosophy consistent with the FAR and DFARS, and the 
availability of coursework based on personnel career track requirements. Training for 
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all of today’s DoD workforce reflects increasing demands for skilled employees with 
high levels of expertise. 
DoD acquisition personnel must have relevant education and applicable 
experience to be hired. Employees are informed of training objectives and requirements 
before they are hired, and must complete ongoing mandatory training as directed. There 
are three levels of training required to obtain certification in contracting, and to be 
eligible for retention and advancement. Coursework is fulfilled through Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU), and some contracting employees are required to obtain 
a Masters degree in Acquisition and Contracting Management that is offered by the 
Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). 
Current DAU and NPS coursework topics for acquisition personnel include: 
Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR) Fundamentals, Contracting Fundamentals, 
Principles of Acquisition and Program Management, Economics for Managers, 
Contract Law, Cost and Price Analysis, Business Decisions for Contracting, Legal 
Considerations in Contracting, Source Selection, Administration of Service Contracts, 
Contingency Contracting, Negotiation Techniques, and Contract Administration. 
Recommendations were made in the research discussed above for a three-
phased approach to training inexperienced personnel: (1) a comprehensive core block 
of instruction on incentive contracting for Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) Level II business and technical personnel; (2) just-in-time 
training using a continuous learning module on incentives; and (3) lessons learned in a 
community of practice (COP) or in classroom teaching from within or by an institution 
such as the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). It was recommended that entire 
acquisition teams should participate in the third phase together to develop teamwork in 
the learning process. 
Administration of award-fee contracts is time and resource intensive, and 
allocating time for training places additional demands on DoD managers and 
contracting personnel. Understanding and applying the laws, regulations, guidance, 
instructions, and directives is difficult and demanding, with the additional burden of the 
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current climate of sequestration, furloughs, and budget cuts. Investing resources for 
training is of paramount importance to decreasing waste and inefficiencies in award-fee 
contracting. 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
The success rate and risk level of DoD award-fee contracts depends on many 
resources and factors, including funding, technology, leadership, and agency or military 
service culture. Each of these factors can significantly alter the final desired outcome. 
The most critical element for cost-effective solutions to all DoD contracting, including 
award-fee contracting, is adequate training of the acquisition workforce. Although 
award-fee contracts represent a relatively small portion of overall government 
contracts, the amount of money involved in DoD contracts more than justifies a 
commitment of sufficient resources to training acquisition personnel. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
As recommended by the GAO reports, in order to improve the usage of award-
fee contracts within the DoD, the regulation guidance and agency guidance need to be 
more comprehensive, consistent, and more detailed on how to administer and 
accurately evaluate award-fee contracts.  
To achieve this goal of conducting cost-saving, effective, and high-quality 
performance on award-fee contracts, contracting agencies must have highly-trained 
contracting officers and contracting specialists. Each agency must develop a standard 
operating plan and procedures guidance which registers throughout the contracting 
agencies. The guidance for award-fee contracts needs to be detailed and clear in the 
evaluation procedures and the administration of fees awarded to the contractor. In 
simple terms, the “guesswork” needs to be completely removed from this form of 
contracting in order for award-fee contracts to do what they were designed to do, as 
motivator to the contractor and a tool for the federal government to achieve the desired 
objectives in a cost-effective manner.  
Ultimately, there is a need to unify guidance institutionally and train the 
acquisition workforce adequately on the development, management, and administration 
of award-fee contracts and the benefits of utilizing this type contract vehicle for the 
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DoD in federal government contracting. Training and development of personnel would 
allow for more objective assessments in determination of award fees and therefore 
reduce risk, increase efficiency and effectiveness, and obtain the desired outcomes for 
the DoD and the federal government. 
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